

DD/S&T# 1039-71

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Approved For Release 2003/08/19 : CIA-RDP74B00681R000200050018-7

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OSA 1042-71
2 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Administrative Support Staff, DDS&T

SUBJECT: Overseas OPRED Requirements

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum dated 29 March 1971,
Subject: Same (DD/S&T 752-71/1)

According to present projections the OPRED ceiling currently assigned to OSA will be fully committed as of 30 June 1971. It is not anticipated at this time that there will be any changes or adjustments to our OPRED needs unless additional operational requirements are placed on this component.

[Redacted Signature]

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Comptroller
Office of Special Activities

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DIA and OSD review(s) completed.

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

March 25, 1971

Honorable John S. Foster, Jr.
Director, Defense Research and Engineering
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Johnny:

As mentioned in our recent discussion, the Defense Science Board Ocean Surveillance Task Force has considered the DIA "Special Defense Intelligence Estimate" issued in December, 1970 which discussed certain aspects of Soviet antisubmarine warfare.

While the Panel welcomes the interest of DIA in this important area, it has several reservations concerning the report. These reservations have been discussed in greater detail in the attached document. The comments of the Panel in the attached document express the nearly unanimous opinion of the group.

Best Regards,

Charles M. Herzfeld
Defense Science Board

Attachment

cc: Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett
Rear Admiral F. J. Harlfinger, USN TS#202088
→ Dr. Donald Steininger
Dr. Gerald Tape
Dr. Louis W. Tordella
Dr. Nils F. Wikner

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

DEFENSE SCIENCE PANEL COMMENTS ON DIA

"Special Defense Intelligence Estimate"

"Unconventional Soviet Approaches to ASW" - Dec. 1970 (S)

1. The Panel welcomes the interest of the DIA in such an important subject as Soviet ASW. The well-known emphasis of the Soviets on building a modern Navy, and the importance of size and quality of Soviet ASW in the Soviet Navy make it especially important for the DIA to analyze Soviet ASW capabilities.

2. We found the DIA document interesting and thought-provoking, and we give more detailed reactions below. However, it is the conviction of this Panel that this type of report should not be identified as an "Intelligence Estimate," since this nomenclature is used for a definite, specific type of intelligence output, arrived at by a particular process. It could be misleading to identify a study such as this report as an "Intelligence Estimate".

3. The DIA document does not in our view provide a valid estimate of current or future Soviet ASW capabilities, but rather concentrates on future technology developments and possible technological surprises. The report does not show the likelihood that some of the new and unconventional technologies will work at all. The document emphasizes sensors and devices, but does not examine possible system or operational capability improvements coming from these. It is not easy to make this connection between devices and capabilities but it is essential to do so to make the conclusions valid. Without this connection, the major conclusions are not supported by the examples given.

4. The paper seems to us to be further deficient in that it does not distinguish between the possibilities of technological surprises on the one hand, and the operational significance of such surprises to U.S. capabilities on the other hand. The paper implies repeatedly that the possible technological advances listed are, in themselves, causes for grave alarm. The Panel does not find a firm basis for these conclusions.

5. The paper does not treat convincingly the unconventional aspects of the problem. Some technologies described, such as IR wake detection, have been studied in detail by the U.S. but not deployed. They are not unconventional in any meaningful sense. They just don't seem to work

well enough to be worth deploying at least for the U.S. It is possible that the Soviets have found the "magic twist" for the IR wake detection, and have converted it into a major system capability, but it is not likely, and the case is not made in the report.

6. The paper seems to confuse "deployed capabilities" with R&D activities or "one-of-a-kind" activities, or "op-eval" activities, or tech intelligence activities, e.g., the Ingul device, the modified Bear aircraft, the Sicily strait buoy line. (The last could be an operational device and could be important; there is no reason to believe it to be very unconventional.)

7. The paper does not support the systems' conclusion that the technologies described will have a large degrading effect on U.S. FBM safety. The likelihood of sudden, large, degrading effects is low. The paper does not discuss the possibility (much more likely in our view) of a slow and gradual erosion of the safety of our present system.

8. Magnetics. Our view is unchanged on this issue:

(a) It is very likely that a large complex development program is going on; (b) it is possible that a communication system based on such phenomena could be built, and this should be investigated; (c) it is extremely unlikely that a long-range underwater surveillance system of this type could be built. The report exaggerates the likelihood of this coming about.

9. It is our understanding that the Navy answers were not originally written for inclusion in the report. While many of them seem reasonably adequate, in aggregate they convey a posture "all is well". This looks inappropriate to us.